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'something it is like to be in that state' from a subjective or first-person point of view.
11 When I am, for example, having a conscious visual experience, there is something it "seems" or "feels"
like from my subjective perspective. But when a conscious mental state is a first-order worlddirected state the higher-order thought (HOT) is not itself conscious; otherwise, circularity and an infinite regress would follow. Moreover, when the HOT is itself conscious, there is a yet higher-order (or third-order) thought directed at the second-order state. In this case, we have introspection which involves a conscious HOT directed at an inner state. When one introspects, one's attention is directed back into one's mind.
For example, what makes my desire to write a good paper a conscious first-order desire is that there is a (nonconscious) HOT directed at the desire. In such a case, my conscious focus is directed at the paper. When I introspect that desire, however, I then have a conscious HOT directed at the desire itself. Figure 1 summarizes the contrast between first-order conscious states and introspective states on the standard HOT theory.
11 Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to be a Bat?," Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 435-450. 6 I suggest that self-consciousness is simply having meta-psychological or higher-order thoughts, even when the HOT is not itself conscious. A higher-order thought is, of course, simply a thought directed at another mental state. I have therefore argued at length 12 that consciousness entails self-consciousness, but it is important to note here that there are degrees or levels of self-consciousness, with introspection as its more complex form. Thus, all introspection involves self-consciousness, but not necessarily vice versa. Some might still wonder why self-consciousness need not be consciousness of something. I offer two reasons here:
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(1) Few (if any) philosophers hold that self-consciousness is literally "consciousness of a self," especially since Hume's observation that we are not aware of an unchanging or underlying self but only a succession of mental states. Thus the "ordinary meaning" of 'self-consciousness ' is somewhat open because the term does not wear its meaning on its sleeve. We are somewhat free to stipulate a meaning, though not of course in an entirely arbitrarily manner. It is clear from The Transcendence of the Ego that Sartre shares the view that there is no "I" or "self" standing behind one"s sequence of mental states. There "is no ego "in" or "behind"
consciousness." 14 This is Sartre"s well-known rejection of Husserl"s "transcendental ego" which is one of the two most important differences between Sartre and Husserl. 15 (2) Other 12 In CSC. 13 See CSC 17-18 for several additional reasons.
14 This is a quote from the translator"s introduction at TE 21. On this point see also Phyllis Berdt
Kenevan, "Self-Consciousness and the Ego in the Philosophy of Sartre," in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, ed. Paul Schilpp (LaSalle: Open Court Press, 1981), chap. 7. 15 The other major difference is Sartre"s rejection of Husserl"s "bracketing" of the belief in the existence of outer phenomena. 7 philosophers have proposed even weaker definitions of "self-consciousness." For example, Van
Gulick holds that it is simply the possession of meta-psychological information. 16 While I believe that his notion is too weak, my point here is only that my definition is not the weakest one in the literature. Owen Flanagan also recognizes a "weaker" form of self-consciousness when he says that "all subjective experience is self-conscious in the weak sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have that experience. This involves a sense that the experience is the subject's experience, that it...occurs in her stream." 18 In this section I will use the terms "unconscious" and "nonconscious" interchangeably. 19 Of course, a full answer to the question "what makes a higher-order thought "suitable"?" would require a lengthy digression that I cannot pursue here. One condition, for example, is that the HOT must be a momentary or occurrent state as opposed to a dispositional state. See CSC chapters 3 and 4 for my attempt at answering the above question. Moreover, the terminology can be a bit confusing. Sometimes the term "thought" is used as a generic term covering all kinds of mental states, but it is also sometimes contrasted with "perception." For our purposes, we can 8 that is, those mental states not accompanied by a HOT. However, Sartre explicitly rejects the existence of the Freudian unconscious which would seem to rule out the existence of first-order nonconscious mental states. For example, Sartre says that "pleasure cannot exist "before" consciousness of pleasure..." (BN 14) and "to believe is to know that one believes..." (BN 114) Indeed, this is precisely what leads Sartre to address the problem of how so-called "bad faith" (la mauvaise foi) is possible without presupposing an unconscious part of the mind. Sartre argues that postulating the Freudian unconscious would not even solve this paradox. Bad faith is basically "lying to oneself" and is commonly treated as a form of self-deception. 20 In any case, Sartre was not attempting to answer the above question in a way that would easily allow for unconscious first-order mental states.
Some commentators, however, have questioned Sartre"s blanket rejection of the unconscious as apparently articulated in the section titled "Bad Faith" in BN. Phyllis Sutton
Morris notes how many Sartre scholars believe that Sartre eventually came to accept "that there think of the higher-order state as some kind of higher-order awareness. See CSC 95-101 for some discussion of this matter. 20 The topic of bad faith is a major issue in its own right that I cannot address here. For a small sample of the literature, however, see Robert Stone, "Sartre on Bad Faith and Authenticity," in We also find a surprising passage at BN 437 where Sartre seems to endorse a belief in unconscious pains when, for example, "my reading "absorbs me" and when I "forget" my pain (which does not mean that it has disappeared since if I happen to gain knowledge of it in a later reflective act, it will be given as having always been there)." The parenthetical remark seems to suggest that the pain existed throughout my reading even when I was not conscious of it. unconscious realm into his theory of consciousness would threaten a belief in freedom. After all, the belief in causally active unconscious mental states is frequently used by determinists in response to a wide variety of arguments for free will, such as the well-known "argument from deliberation" whereby we infer that we really could have done otherwise from the first-person observation that we frequently deliberate over choices and then seem to be able to perform more than one action at a given time.
In any case, despite some very real questions regarding Sartre"s views on unconscious Wider would view the rejection of the unconscious as a counterexample to the thesis that conscious states are self-conscious.
Let us now proceed to another aspect of the HOT theory addressed by Sartre.
B. The Infinite Regress
As I mentioned in section 2, the HOT theorist avoids definitional circularity and an infinite regress by explaining that the HOT is not itself conscious when one has a first-order (assertoric). However, it is unclear why this should be so and that there is really a problem here for the WIV. In such a case, we would have a first-order conscious doubt directed at the weather accompanied by a MET of the form "I (nonconsciously but assertorically ) think that I am doubting it is raining." The MET affirms the doubt and that is what makes the lower-order doubt conscious. Thus, the complex conscious state is still a first-order world-directed conscious doubt, albeit with an assertoric meta-psychological component. 16 conscious state. Otherwise, we would be explaining consciousness by appealing to consciousness, which is circular. Moreover, we would have an infinite regress because for every conscious state there would have to be a higher-order conscious state and so on ad infinitum.
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So, for example, on the WIV, the MET is a nonconscious part of a first-order conscious mental state. Sartre interestingly noticed a similar problem, but instead of straightforwardly responding in like manner, he first says the following in TE:
All reflecting consciousness is, indeed, in itself unreflected, and a new act of the third degree is necessary in order to posit it. Moreover, there is no infinite regress here, since a consciousness has no need at all of a reflecting consciousness in order to be conscious of itself. It simply does not posit itself as an object. (TE 45)
And then in BN Sartre puts it as follows:
Either we stop at any one term of the series -the known, the knower known, the knower known by the knower, etc. In this case the totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown; that is, we always bump up against a non-conscious reflection and a final term. Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress What are we to make of these passages? A full answer to this question will not be entirely clear until the end of section 4. However, to anticipate some of that discussion, we can see that in the TE quote Sartre is first recognizing that when there is "reflecting" (i.e. However, Sartre still must account for the non-positional awareness in pre-reflective consciousness that we described briefly in section 1. For example, Sartre holds that "every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself..." (BN 13) In the TE passage, Sartre is making the point that such non-positional consciousness of itself "does not posit itself as an object." As I will argue in the next subsection, this is tantamount to holding the WIV where the non-positional self-consciousness is part of the conscious mental state. Such self-consciousness is not separate from the mental state it is directed at, and this is why Sartre says that it "does not posit an object." So despite Sartre"s claim that all consciousness is consciousness of something, he is apparently saying that, when it comes to such self-consciousness, it does not really posit an object, or at least not a distinct object. After all, he does call it "non-positional self-consciousness." (BN 26, emphasis added) This is also why he uses the "of" [de] in parenthases merely out of "grammatical necessity" when speaking of such non-positional self-consciousness (of) self.
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Similarly, in the BN quote, Sartre avoids the regress by first rejecting any separation between such self-consciousness and the world-directed conscious state; that is, by rejecting the "knower-known" dyad. consciousness, is "not dual." And so, again, "if we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself." (BN 12) I will return to this last statement in section 4, but we can already see how Sartre is trying to make room for some kind of meta-psychological awareness which is part of each conscious mental state.
But why not just call such meta-psychological awareness a "nonconscious thought (or awareness)"? Sartre"s reluctance to call the "non-positional awareness" in pre-reflective consciousness a "nonconscious thought" is perhaps partly due to his rejection of the first-order unconscious. However, I suggest that we must interpret Sartre as logically committed to the existence of nonconscious METs. What else is a "non-positional self-awareness" except some kind of nonconscious meta-psychological mental state? I cannot understand it any other way.
Such an awareness is clearly a mental state of some kind. Indeed, this seems to be the standard interpretation offered by numerous commentators. For example, Thomas Busch tells us that "unreflective consciousness intends or posits an object other than itself and is simultaneously non-positionally self-aware," 37 and Peter Caws explains that Sartre insists on "the necessary accompaniment of every act of consciousness with a state of unreflective self-awareness..."
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Furthermore, either "non-positional self-awareness" is conscious (which is absurd and would lead to the infinite regress) or it is a nonconscious mental state of some kind (which is therefore the only viable alternative). One"s conscious mind cannot be directed both at outer objects and at one"s own mind at the same time, and so the non-positional self-awareness that accompanies one"s pre-reflective (positional) consciousness of outer objects must be nonconscious. object, but not explicitly of ourselves being aware of (desiring, thinking of, etc.) of that object." 40 Thus, when our consciousness is outer-directed we are not explicitly (i.e. reflectively) aware of the lower-order state, but we are implicitly (i.e. non-positionally) aware of ourselves being aware of the outer object. Morris also explains that "...our most common conscious activities are prereflective or unreflective -not in the sense of being thoughtless, but rather in the sense of being explicitly directed toward objects other than ourselves and our actions...It is only when someone takes his own conscious activities as the object of his attention that he has begun to reflect in Sartre"s sense." 41 To bring this even closer to the WIV version of the HOT theory, consider the following passage:
The Perhaps even more striking is the following passage:
...it is the very nature of consciousness to exist "in a circle."... We understand now why the first consciousness of consciousness is not positional; it is because it is one with the consciousness of which it is consciousness. ( The reflective consciousness intends in a positional manner the pre-reflective Such quotes fit nicely with my comparison of Sartre"s theory of reflective consciousness and the explanation offered by the WIV. The higher-order reflecting state has the same internal structure as a first-order conscious state, but in the former case its object is another mental state whereas in the latter case it is an outer object.
Thus, to summarize, it is clear that Sartre views "non-positional self-awareness" as a form of self-consciousness since he believed that first-order outer-directed conscious states are also self-conscious states. Like a HOT theorist, however, he also recognized a higher-order form of self-consciousness which he called "reflection" in BN (instead of "introspection"). So when one is in a first-order conscious mental state, one has a complex state such that one is positionally aware of an outer object but also non-positionally aware of that awareness. When one is in a second-order reflective state, one has a complex higher-order conscious "reflecting" state directed at (or positionally aware of) a first-order "reflected-on" state of consciousness. In this case, the complex second-order state is also constituted by both positional awareness (of the lower-order state) and a non-positional awareness of itself.
D. Two Types of Reflection
In order to complete the discussion up to this point it is necessary to mention briefly Sartre"s distinction between pure and impure reflection. As I noted at the end of section one, my use of the term "reflection" until now has been short for what Sartre calls "pure reflection." This is because it is pure reflection that is closer to the notion of "reflecting on one"s current states of mind." Pure reflection is more of an "immediate reflection" on ourselves or on the present that has just been made past. 47 On the other hand, impure reflection is more on our "remote past"and is a "more deliberate and, therefore, cognitive reflection..." Impure reflection is the "reflection emphasis added. states of mind. We might, for example, be engaged in reflective deliberate examination of our own current philosophical beliefs. While Sartre is right that we may reflect on our "past" succession of mental states, he seems to reserve such deliberation to impure reflection.
However, deliberate introspection can be both pure and impure.
The Unity Problem
In this section I apply the results from section 3 to what I will call "the unity and separation problem," or "the unity problem" for short, which is vividly presented by Kathleen Although the WIV can help Sartre to some degree, Wider is correct that he continues to have a problem. Even if I am right in interpreting Sartre as holding the WIV on the prereflective level, the unity problem still remains with respect to the above remarks about knowledge. I believe that Sartre did have something like the WIV in mind, but was simply struggling with how to characterize the relationship between the parts of the complex prereflective conscious state. Speaking of a "duality within a unity" makes sense on the WIV.
There is also sense to be made of the claim that there is "nothing" between the parts, since they are part of the same conscious mental state. So some of the tension in Sartre"s thought can be relieved by my analysis. However, Sartre still runs into serious problems and ambiguities when describing whether or not non-positional self-consciousness is a form of knowledge. It is perhaps understandable, however, why Sartre struggled so much with this problem. Like the WIV, he is trying to make sense of a "directedness" or "aboutness" within the pre-reflective level, but, in doing so, he sometimes characterizes that relation as a kind of knowledge. "unity" and a "bond" between the reflecting consciousness and the reflected-on consciousness, but they cannot be "totally identified" with each other. Rather, as the above quotes make clear, they are part of one "being" (i.e. one conscious mental state) "fused" together into an "indissoluble unity."
In summary and restricting the matter to the reflective level, it might be helpful to put the unity problem by saying that Sartre obviously cannot consistently hold all of the following propositions:
(1) Knowledge requires a separation between the knower and the known object.
(2) Reflection involves knowledge of the "reflected-on" state.
(3) The "reflected-on" is not completely detached from the "reflecting" state.
I have conceded that there is much confusion and ambiguity in Sartre"s use of the terms "knowledge," "separation," and "detachment." If he means "literal separation" implying two distinct "objects" or mental states, then indeed we have an inconsistent triad; that is, he could not hold that both (1) and (3) are true if we accept his initial adherence to (2). Of course, if we allow
Sartre to back off of (2), then (1) and (3) remain consistent but at the cost of trying to understand the difference between "recognition" and "knowledge." However, Sartre could mean "virtual separation" in (1) which I suggest could yield the more coherent position represented in figure 4.
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Recall the quote from Sartre that "...presence to always implies duality, at least a virtual separation. The presence of being to itself implies a detachment on the part of being in relation to itself...But if we ask ourselves...what it is which separates the subject from himself, we are forced to admit that it is nothing." (BN 124, first emphasis added) All three claims could then be consistent. Proposition (1) is true because a virtual separation can allow for knowledge within the very complex reflective state. Proposition (2) is true since the reflecting state would have knowledge of the reflected-on state. And (3) could also be true because, as figure 4 indicates, the reflecting state and the reflected-on state are not completely detached but are part of the same complex reflective state. We can then also understand what Sartre meant by a "quasi-object" when he said that "...the reflected-on is not wholly an object but a quasi-object for [pure]
reflection." (BN 218, emphasis added) A quasi-object, in this context, would be a reflected-on mental state that is only virtually separated from the reflecting state. A quasi-object is not an entirely distinct object of knowledge.
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Unfortunately, one further complication arises when Sartre says such things as:
...reflection -if it is to be apodictic [i.e. certain] evidence -demands that the reflective be that which is reflected-on. But to the extent that reflection is 54 As we saw in section 3A, it is perhaps once again open to Rosenthal to argue that, even though the HOTs are distinct and extrinsic from their targets, the unity in question is the amalgam of both states. The problem for Rosenthal here is twofold: (a) As was mentioned in section 3A, if figure 4 . This would then make it even more difficult for him to treat the unity in question simply as an amalgam of three distinct parts. As I hope I have made clear in this section, however, I believe that we are all struggling to make sense of this "parts in a unity" idea.
Nonetheless, I have argued that the WIV holds out the best prospect for success. 34 knowledge, the reflected-on must necessarily be the object for the reflective; and this implies a separation of being. Thus it is necessary that the reflective simultaneously be and not be the reflected-on. (BN 213-4 not be identical with itself? Now some of Sartre"s discussion of this matter goes well beyond the scope of this paper and has to do with the temporality of consciousness, which is a major topic in its own right. 58 However, Sartre also speaks as if such a denial applies to the structure of conscious mental states, which is our primary concern in this paper. Moreover, he seemed to think that denying the Law followed from his view that consciousness is self-consciousness. I
believe that Sartre was mistaken, but let us see exactly why. One place where he discusses this issue is back at BN 114 in describing conscious belief:
To believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe. Thus to believe is not to believe any longer because that is only to believe -this is the unity of one and the same non-thetic consciousness....To believe is not-to-believe. (BN 114)
The idea seems to be that conscious mental states and, in this case, conscious belief is not identical to itself. As Wider puts it: "[Conscious belief] is and is not what it is. Belief is belief but because it is self-conscious it is not belief." (TLG 334) I agree with Wider when she says that she fails "to see how it follows from the fact that self-awareness is a property of pre- 
The BN 11 Argument
In chapter four of BNC, Wider considers several alleged counterexamples to the general thesis that consciousness entails self-consciousness (hereafter, the CESC Thesis) and discusses 59 And, of course, the mere fact that mental states are directed "outside of themselves" does not violate the Law either. To think so would be to confuse the mental state with the content of the mental state.
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how Sartre might reply. 60 In that chapter, however, Wider also discusses what I consider to be Sartre"s main argument for his belief that all consciousness is self-consciousness. As I have made clear throughout this paper, I agree with many of Sartre"s conclusions about the structure of conscious states as well as being a defender of the CESC Thesis. However, this is not to say that I agree with all of his reasoning for that thesis, and his main argument for it is shaky at best.
This often quoted passage goes as follows::
...the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that Much of this is reminiscent of the Kantian idea that having experience of outer objects presupposes distinguishing them from oneself. Thus, having I-thoughts are presupposed in objective experience. At the very least, in order to having conscious thoughts about external objects one must be able to differentiate them from oneself (including one"s own body and one"s own mental states). If one did not implicitly distinguish outer objects from oneself, then one would treat the enduring objects of experience as merely momentary fleeting subjective states which, in turn, would make objective experience impossible. Restricting ourselves to bodily self-awareness, then, Wider tells us in a Kantian spirit that "without bodily self-consciousness, consciousness of the world is impossible." (BNC 118) Citing such prominent philosophers as Daniel Dennett and Owen Flanagan, Wider explains that "even on the most primitive levels of conscious life, simply to survive an organism must be able to distinguish its biological self from that which is not itself. There must be an ability to make a me/not-me distinction." (BNC 122-3) As I mentioned above, it would seem likely that even the lowest of conscious creatures are at least capable of having the type 4 I-concept. This would therefore support the idea that even the most primitive conscious creatures are self-conscious in at least this rudimentary way. follow that entire body is conscious. Rather, one has a kind of self-awareness which refers to one"s own body (an "I-thought"). But the complex conscious mental state itself can still be identified with neural activity, though the HOT theorist is typically silent on this empirical question.
Wider also seems to be confusing what Rosenthal calls "creature consciousness" with "state consciousness." 71 The former recognizes that we often speak of whole organisms as conscious, but the latter recognizes that we also speak of specific mental states as being conscious. Indeed, it is state consciousness that has been my primary concern throughout this paper and Sartre is also clearly first and foremost attempting to present a theory of state consciousness. Thus, when one is concerned with examining what makes particular mental states conscious, a mind-brain identity theory can still arguably be the most plausible reductionist alternative while also remaining compatible with everything said earlier in this section. In short, conscious mental states can still be neural states while also referring to the body and having the structure defended throughout this paper. Bodily aware I-thoughts accompany every conscious mental state, but it does not follow that the entire body is conscious. My conscious visual perception of the tree contains implicit reference to my body, but the visual experience itself can still just be identical with a pattern of neural activity in my visual cortex. Indeed, it would not 71 Rosenthal, "A Theory of Consciousness." 45 even seem to make sense to say that such a conscious mental state is my body.
Perhaps even more puzzling is Wider"s analogy that "just as a jet engine needs wings and tail and other parts to generate flight in the aircraft, so too the brain needs kidneys and lungs and blood and air to generate consciousness." (BNC 114) If this is meant to support the identity of the body and consciousness, then it also fails because, first of all, in the case of an airplane there is no analog to state consciousness; that is, we only speak of the entire airplane flying and never just of an engine flying. Secondly, Wider is confusing a necessary condition with an identity claim: it is one thing to say that A needs {B, C, .... X} in order to generate Z, but quite another to say that {A...X} is Z. Once again, the latter does not follow from the former. It is still perfectly possible that only A (or a part of A) is conscious. Even Wider seems to concede this in her analogy by saying that the "brain... generate [s] consciousness" (albeit with the help of the necessary conditions she mentions, such as blood and air). Thus, we must be careful not to take
Sartre"s theory as ruling out a mind-brain identity theory.
Conclusion
Although Sartre may not have always argued well for his conclusion that consciousness is self-consciousness and although he did often struggle with the details of his theory (such as with the unity problem), I hope I have shown that he had much of value to say about the structure of conscious mental states. For example, Sartre"s theory is importantly related to the HOT theory of consciousness and he held a modified version of the theory. I have therefore shown how his views can be informatively placed against the background of a contemporary analytic approach to consciousness. Sartre also addressed several key issues frequently associated with the HOT theory, such as the threat of an infinite regress and the debate over the existence of nonconscious mentality. Finally, as Kathleen Wider has helped us to understand, Sartre"s theory also offers insights into the important relationship between having conscious mental states and 46 the presence of so-called "I-thoughts." 72 72 Thanks to Kathleen Wider and Yiwei Zheng for some helpful correspondence during my work on this paper. Thanks also to a referee for several helpful comments.
